June 17 (LPAC)--A new expose by Seymour Hersh in New Yorker magazine can lead to a round of investigations into the torture at Abu Ghraib in Iraq that goes further than any previous investigation on the subject--and could put former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld under investigation for his malfeasance and mis-statements to Congress.
Based on exclusive interviews with the Army Major General Antonio M. Taguba, who conducted the first investigation into the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Hersh has opened up a new chapter in the investigation of the conduct of the war that could possibly move the cowardly Democratic-run Congress into taking the responsibility for oversight, that they have so far refused to take, and holding the Executive Branch responsible.
The story by Hersh, in the June 25 issue of New Yorker, called, "The General's Report," makes it clear that "2008 is Too Late," to wait for cleaning out the White House. "2008 is Too Late" has become the rousing slogan used by the LaRouche Youth Movement (LYM) in thLPAC successful drive to rally Democrats to impeach Dick Cheney. LPAC has documented that the legal "basis" for the use of abuse and torture of Iraqi detainees came from Cheney's office.
The lengthy story by Hersh contains a wealth of details, but the events of May 6 and May 7, 2004 paint a horrifying picture of the cynicism and evil housed in the office of the Secretary of Defense, where his top deputies, Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen Cambone, were followers of transplanted Nazi philosopher, Leo Strauss, and ran the Department on the basis of Strauss' admiration for the twisting of truth advocated by Thrasymachus, the character in Plato's Dialogues, known for opposing Socrates' proof of the existence of "justice."
What General Taguba describes to Hersh, fits the Straussian profile published by LPAC in the ground-breaking work, "Children of Satan: The Ignoble Liars Behind Bush's No-Win War in Iraq" (April, 2003), "to a T."
Hersh describes a crucial meeting--May 6, 2004, the first time Taguba met Rumsfeld. Here is what Taguba describes about the meeting and followup:
"Here . . . comes . . . that famous General Taguba of the Taguba report!' Rumsfeld declared, in a mocking voice. The meeting was attended by Paul Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's deputy; Stephen Cambone, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.); and General Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, along with Craddock and other officials. Taguba, describing the moment nearly three years later, said, sadly, I thought they wanted to know. I assumed they wanted to know. I was ignorant of the setting.
"In the meeting, the officials professed ignorance about Abu Ghraib. `Could you tell us what happened?' Wolfowitz asked. Someone else asked, `Is it abuse or torture?' At that point, Taguba recalled, I described a naked detainee lying on the wet floor, handcuffed, with an interrogator shoving things up his rectum, and said, That's not abuse. That's torture. There was quiet.
"Rumsfeld was particularly concerned about how the classified report had become public. `General,' he asked, `who do you think leaked the report?' Taguba responded that perhaps a senior military leader who knew about the investigation had done so. It was just my speculation, he recalled. Rumsfeld didn't say anything.....
"Here I am,' Taguba recalled Rumsfeld saying, `just a Secretary of Defense, and we have not seen a copy of your report. I have not seen the photographs, and I have to testify to Congress tomorrow and talk about this.' As Rumsfeld spoke, Taguba said, `He's looking at me. It was a statement.''
Rumsfeld's profession of ignorance was a lie, Hersh shows. "At best, Taguba said, `Rumsfeld was in denial.' Taguba had submitted more than a dozen copies of his report through several channels at the Pentagon and to the Central Command headquarters, in Tampa, Florida, which ran the war in Iraq. By the time he walked into Rumsfelds conference room, he had spent weeks briefing senior military leaders on the report, but he received no indication that any of them, with the exception of General Schoomaker, had actually read it. (Schoomaker later sent Taguba a note praising his honesty and leadership.) When Taguba urged one lieutenant general to look at the photographs, he rebuffed him, saying, `I don't want to get involved by looking, because what do you do with that information, once you know what they show?'|''
In his appearance the next day, Rumsfeld denied everything making the most outrageous statements, Hersh describes:
"Taguba said, `You didn't need to see anything, just take the secure e-mail traffic at face value'.... And, "Nevertheless, Rumsfeld, in his appearances before the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees on May 7th, claimed to have had no idea of the extensive abuse. `It breaks our hearts that in fact someone didn't say, `Wait, look, this is terrible. We need to do something,' Rumsfeld told the congressmen. `I wish we had known more, sooner, and been able to tell you more sooner, but we didn't.'....
Rummy claimed that the Taguba report "was not yet in the Pentagon to my knowledge....."I say no one in the Pentagon had seen them [the photographs]" and at the House, he said, "I didnt see them until last night at 7:30."
He added, that "The legal part of it was proceeding along fine. What wasn't proceeding along fine is the fact that the President didn't know, and you didn't know, and I didn't know."
Concluding, Rumsfeld added, "And, as a result, somebody just sent a secret report to the press, and there they are.'' The article includes references to the fact that Taguba believed that Rumsfeld's testimony "was simply not true," and wondered "if perhaps Cambone had the photographs and kept them from Rumsfeld..." out of fear of Rumsfeld's notorious reaction to "bad news."